1) Jonas, La responsabilità per il da_farsi
In questa lettura Jonas prende in considerazione non il rapporto fra ciò che abbiamo fatto e le nostre responsabilità, ma la responsabilità in rapporto a ciò che dobbiamo fare (e abbiamo il potere di farlo).
1) H. Jonas, Il principio responsabilità
Esiste però ancora un concetto complementare diverso di responsabilità che non riguarda la resa dei conti ex-post-facto per quanto è stato compiuto ma la determinazione del da-farsi, rispetto al quale io mi sento responsabile in primo no place for my behavior and its consequences, but for the cause that requires me to act. For example, the "responsibility" for the welfare of others is not limited to "select" purposes of action data in view of their eligibility moral requirements, but actions that are not designed for any other purpose.
[...]
The "for what" is outside of me, even if under the influence of my power, and depends on good and evil . The "for what" my power to offset its right to exist from that which is or may be, e assoggetta il potere mediante la volontà morale. La causa diventa mia, poiché il potere è mio e ha una relazione causale proprio con lei. Ciò che è dipendente nel suo diritto autonomo acquista potere normativo, ciò che è potente nella sua causalità viene sottoposto a obbligazione. Il potere diventa oggettivamente responsabile per ciò che in quel modo gli viene affidato, e vi si impegna affettivamente mediante la presa di posizione del senso di responsabilità: nel sentimento ciò che è vincolante viene a legarsi alla volontà soggettiva. Ma la presa di posizione del sentimento non ha la sua origine prima nell’idea di responsabilità tout court ma nel riconoscimento della bontà peculiare della causa, in how it affects the feel and humiliates the pure selfishness of power. First is the "ought" (Seinsollen) of the object, secondly, the "must do" (Tunsollen) the party called upon to care for it. The need of the object on the one hand, the absence of guarantees of its existence, and the moral conscience of power on the other hand, in the causation of his guilt, blend in the affirmative responsibility of the actor, who always already interfere in the being of things. If one adds to the love, the responsibility is raised by the dedication of the person who learns to fear for the fate of those who are worthy of exist and to be loved.
Today when we speak of the future need for an ethic of responsibility is precisely to this kind of responsibility and sense of responsibility, not the empty "responsibility" of any formal agent for his action. We will have to compare it with the principle motivation of previous moral systems and their theories. Empirically, we will approach this concept in the best way to substantial, purposeful, accountability, if we ask what can be understood by an "irresponsible act" (given that we can say without contradiction, based on two different concepts of responsibility, che si è responsabili anche per le azioni piú irresponsabili). In questo caso andrà però escluso il senso formalistico di “irresponsabile” = privo della capacità di rispondere di qualcosa e perciò tale da non poter essere ritenuto responsabile.
H. Jonas, Il principio responsabilità, Einaudi, Torino, 1990, pagg. 117-118
2) Jonas, Il fondamento della morale, la responsabilità man for man
After considering the responsibility in concrete and abstract sense, the Jonas back to the three concepts of wholeness, continuity and future and the archetype of all responsibility: that of ' Man for man, which is to be understood as a value-sided, but does not reject reciprocity.
H. Jonas, The principle responsibility
The common element can be summarized in three concepts of "totality", "continuity" and "future", reported the existence and happiness of human beings. They assume, first, that given the fundamental point of reference "human being". It shows insecurity, vulnerability, revocability - peculiar mode of transience - of every living thing, making it the sole object of attention (Obhut), but beyond this the humanum commonality with the sphere of responsibility, which on the claim that the most original, though perhaps not the only one. Every living being is an end in itself and needs no further justification: in this respect man is not in any way superior to other living beings, except to be only him responsible for them, that is for the protection of their being ends in themselves. But in sharing the fate of his fellow human purposes, they share them or whether he merely recognize them in others, and the purpose of their existence in itself, can converge in a unique way in his own end: the archetype of all responsibility is that of man to man. This primacy of kinship in the subject-object relationship of responsibility is inherent in the nature of the matter conclusively. It means, inter alia, that the report, although one-sided in himself and in each individual case, however, is reversible and includes a potential reciprocity. Indeed, the general reciprocity is always present, because I responsible for someone living among human beings are also the subject of the responsibility to someone else. This comes from non-self-sufficiency of man: each has experienced, first on himself the responsibility of the original parental care. This fundamental paradigm becomes clear in the most convincing way the plot of the responsibility with all that is animated. Only living things, in its constitutive poverty and vulnerability, may be subject to liability, but this is only necessary and not sufficient. What distinguishes humans, namely that only he can have a responsibility, at the same time means that he should have for his fellow men, themselves subject to potential liability, and that, in one way or another, already possesses: the ability to get it is the condition enough of its actualization.
H. Jonas, The principle of responsibility, Einaudi, Torino, 1990, pp. 124-125
3) Jonas, The ethics of responsibility
Jonas opposed the "principle of responsibility" is the "principle Hope, "is the" beginning fear ", even if the philosopher states that fear is now necessary. The ultimate goal is to protect "the integrity of man."
H. Jonas, the principle of accountability
the beginning hope contrasts with the principle responsibility and the principle of fear. But fear, even if they fall into some disrepute moral and psychological, is the responsibility of just how much hope, and we are here still plead the cause, for fear is now more necessary than at any other time when, animated confidence in the good performance of cose umane, si poteva considerarla con sufficienza una debolezza dei pusillanimi e dei nevrotici.
a) Paura, speranza e responsabilità.
La speranza è una condizione di ogni agire, poiché questo presuppone di poter conseguire qualcosa facendo affidamento sulla possibilità di ottenerlo in quel caso determinato. Per chi sa il fatto suo (e anche per chi è favorito dalla fortuna), potrà trattarsi non solo di speranza, ma anche di sicurezza di sé. In considerazione di tutto ciò di cui l’agire si fa carico si potrà solo sperare che già il risultato immediato, e a maggior ragione i suoi effetti ulteriori nell’imprevedibile fluire delle cose, saranno davvero quelli auspicati. L’individuo must be aware whenever you can want to take the viewpoint later (in hindsight) of failing to act or have acted differently. Fear does not refer to this uncertainty, or refers to it only as contributory factors. Do not let fear distract from action, but rather feel responsible in advance for the unknown is, before the final uncertainty of hope, just a condition of agency responsibilities: precisely what is termed the "courage of responsibility" .
When we speak of the fear that nature is the responsibility does not mean the fear that deters from the action, but that which calls for acting; understand the fear of liability for the object. About the latter, we have already shown (in Chapter 4). Which is essentially vulnerable and that is therefore to be feared for it. In this chapter we have analyzed at length in any particular case what leads someone to take ownership of that fear turning into a duty to act. The responsibility is caring for another being where it is recognized as a duty, becoming "apprehension" when the vulnerability of that being is threatened. But fear is already potentially contained in the original question from which you can imagine comes every active responsibility: What will happen to that being, if I do not take care of him? The more obscure the answer is, the more clearly delineated is responsibility. The farther into the future, as more distant from their own joys and sorrows, at least in his family is manifest what is feared, the more clarity and emotional sensitivity must be mobilized for that purpose.
becomes necessary to 'snuff' heuristics of fear that is not limited to discover and represent the new object, but makes himself known to the special interest of ethics that is evoked (not that it had ever been before d 'now). Already ethical theory needs the idea of \u200b\u200bevil as that of good, then all the more if it lost out to our eyes and needs to have its profile through the anticipation of a new impending evil. In a situation where there seems to be the present, the conscious effort of feeding an altruistic fear - which, along with the bad, it also reveals the good that must be safeguarded, along with the disaster, even the salvation that must not be overloaded with illusions - indeed that very fear will become the first duty of the ethics of pre-historic responsibility. We will look closely RELIANCE our fate to those who do not feel quite decent for the human condition this source of ethics of responsibility, "the fear and trepidation" - which of course is never the only source, but sometimes quite reasonably the dominant one. From our side we do not fear the reproach of cowardice and negativity when so declared the fear a duty, which can be naturally the only hope (prevention): founded fear, not hesitancy, perhaps even anxiety but never the dismay and never fear or fear for themselves. It would be cowardice actually avoid the fear if it is necessary.
b) To protect the "integrity of the"
You must learn again to protect us from slipping over the horror of our power (eg from experiments on human nature). The paradox of our situation is the need to regain lost respect for the horror, the expectation of negative, positive, respect for what the man was, and before the horror of what he could become, before the possibility that there is revealed as soon as we inexorably to predict the future. Only respect, revealing "something sacred", that is inviolable in all circumstances (which is experienced even without positive religion), we preserve also from the profane in this view of the future, from wanting to buy it at the price of the first. The hope, as soon as the fear can cause us to postpone to a later stage the real end - the advancement of man in humanity not atrophied - and compromise in the meantime this does not end with the means to meet the man of their own era. Degraded heritage involved in the degradation also heirs. The protection of the heritage in the alleged "man of integrity" and then in the negative, whether the protection from degradation, must be the commitment of each moment: do not grant any break in this protection costituisce la migliore garanzia della stabilità, essendo, se non l’assicurazione, certo il presupposto anche dell’integrità futura dell’identità umana. La sua integrità non è altro che l’apertura verso quella sempre smisurata pretesa – che induce all’umiltà –, rivolta al suo portatore strutturalmente inadeguato. Conservare intatta quell’eredità attraverso i pericoli dei tempi, anzi, contro l’agire stesso dell’uomo, non è un fine utopico, ma il fine, non poi cosí modesto, della responsabilità per il futuro dell’uomo.
"Agisci in modo che le conseguenze della your action are compatible with the survival of human life on earth "
H. Jonas, the principle of accountability, Einaudi, Torino, 1990, pp. 284-287
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