Thursday, March 25, 2010

Wards Population Genetics Evolution

Seconda edizione: si riparte dall'Acrobax!

Ogni mercoledì dal 31 marzo to April 28, c / o Loa Acrobax

Mexico City, San Francisco, Naples, Beirut, Calais: The five stages of the new edition of denied rights, the social film festival for the second consecutive year arrives in Sao Paulo to promote a culture of differences .

After the success of last spring at the Mario Mieli Homosexual Cultural Circle, this time the meetings take place every Wednesday from March 31 to April 28 in the spaces of Loa Acrobax at the 'former dog track of the capital, because of the towing tank 6, a short distance from metro B "Basilica San Paolo" .

From 20.00 depending restaurant and wine bar for an aperitif, followed at 21 is scheduled screening of the film. Admission is free.
At each meeting will be attended by boys Group 251 of Amnesty International to collect signatures for their petitions against several cases of denial of human rights worldwide.

Since 2002, the Laboratory Busy Autogestito Acrobax returned to the city an abandoned space saving him from speculation and making it a place of crossing cultural and aggregation, in constant struggle against the social fragmentation and isolation. The former dog track is part of an active community that wants to transform the present.


More:
http://dirittinegati2010.blogspot.com
dirittinegati@live.it
www.acrobax.org

***
Program:

1. Obsession security
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
The area (of Rodrigo Plá, Mexico 2007)

2. fight against discrimination based on sexual orientation
Wednesday, April 7, 2010
Milk (Gus Van Sant, USA 2008)

3. Freedom of information and anti-mafia
Wednesday, April 14
Fortapàsc (by Marco Risi, Italy, 2009)

4. The absurdity of war
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
Lebanon (Samuel Maoz, Israel, 2009)

5. Freedom of movement and asylum
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
Welcome (Lioret Philippe, France, 2009)

Thursday, March 4, 2010

Burnt Thumb With Lighter

Marco Revelli: "sinistra e destra", l'identità smarrita.

In the alternative school for bright, Turin (www.scuolaperalternativa.it), Paul Ginsborg presented February 18, this book Revelli, questioning along with the audience the author.
Today it seems lost the distinction between these two positions, describing the main policy in the modern world, since 1789: equality or hierarchy, autonomy and heteronomy, rationality or irrationality, horizontal or vertical. Today the so-called radical left does not see more of these alternatives, and the institutional left does not seem to want to seize them. You lose the traditional categories of left space and time.
space of Parliament, winning the nineteenth century, it is emptied: Paolo Cacciari calls "humiliating" his recent parliamentary experience, a pre-established mechanism where the individual has only to press the button to vote. The space of the parties has become perverse: they withdraw from society, and that withdraws from the parties. Even the four secretaries in the Rainbow Left alone decide the nominations.
The linear time and progressive in the design of the Left is in full compliance at the time acceleratissimo, compressed, and filled thus become unavailable for the policy: no time! Thus, lack of political actors and solutions. In the Introduction to the book, Revelli indicates some "meta-values" of the political or constitutional principles, to reconstruct the left, and indeed the same policy that has been lacking.
But, on the left - Ginsborg concludes - is a serious problem behaviors: personal quarrels, and ambitions of individualism, narcissism galore, there is no culture of unity. Many attempts fail because of these evils. Gandhi has much to teach to the left. The churches should do more on this moral level.
Revelli avverte che il suo libro è impegnativo: è un compendio di 25 anni di lavoro, in buona parte entro il seminario “Etica e politica” che Bobbio guidava nel Centro Gobetti. Registra un fallimento, lo smarrimento dell’identità di sinistra. Questa polarità destra-sinistra dà ordine alla politica, come il denaro, strumento di scambio, lo dà all’economia. Siamo caduti in un contesto non più politico. Quelle due identità sono relative, spaziali, non sostantive: dipende da chi si colloca a destra o a sinistra dell’altro.
Il libretto di Bobbio, Destra e sinistra (più edizioni dal 1994, 300.000 copie, tradotto in 19 lingue), contro la delegittimazione di questa distinzione, poneva come criterio il principio di uguaglianza: chi sottolinea ciò che accomuna è di sinistra, chi evidenzia ciò che differenzia è di destra. Dopo la metà degli anni ’90 cambia il dibattito: anche da sinistra si nega quella distinzione.
Soprattutto cade in dubbio il tempo direzionale, che era costitutivo della sinistra, cioè la storia come movimento. Alla fine del 900 il tempo ritorna ciclico, ripetitivo.
Anche la crisi dello spazio liquefa la differenza destra-sinistra. Lo spazio di questa differenza era lo stato-nazione, nei suoi confini territoriali sure, it was public space, produced by public transport, where public authorities overrule the powers private space where all points are under the same law. This space was "represented" in the parliamentary area, which is precisely defined left and right, stability and movement.
The new space of globalization is produced by private means, which are mass media, transmission flows (finance, drugs, information, goods, ...). This space has no boundaries, everything in it overlaps; communications at the speed of light bring to every point in space the different sources of power.
This is the crisis of politics, not only of left-right distinction. It was the left, in the French Revolution, which created the political space: the first was all right, hierarchy. Today the left mimics this right, the most of the project, the scenery more than the content. It's the end of the policy, falls the modern idea of \u200b\u200bpolitics.

Revelli, however, indicates four meta-values \u200b\u200bto reconstruct the left and the political

1) the choice between violence and nonviolence; establish the taboo of violence, which today means the end of humanity;
2) the principle of inclusion against exclusion principle (Carl Scmitt that underlying the policy in the category of friend-enemy), that the reciprocity , the point of view (the Man Planetarium Ernesto Balducci);
3) the principle of prudence, or liability (Hans Jonas, "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of an authentically human life on earth "), against the principle of immediate effectiveness, decisions, productivity
4) the sense of limit against the desire for power.

These values \u200b\u200bare left, but should be shared, in order to counteract the political differences, no overall impairment.
*
The two speakers then responded to various interventions.
Ginsborg - What is left of personal behavior in the important and difficult terrain. The left door is self-defeating when partisan interests, if not cheap. Stuart Mill asked the Citizens: humility, skepticism, imagination. It should, yes, generosity, but it is not only moral issue: we need a theory of political behavior on the left.
left in violence was not only conflict between fair and unfair means the end, but also free and plentiful, and justified, in the old Left: think of the forced collectivization of the land, the Stalinist purges. This was the old Left in 900.
Revelli - In response to an intervention, citing Bobbio (note 1), suggests a difference between right and left not only on the position in the political area, but anthropological, says: I think so, the distinction is deep in the history of our species in terms of symbolic value and we have different instinctive reactions to the scandal of inequality in the face, in front of the Shipwrecks of immigrants in the Strait of Otranto, but the problem is not this, is whether those who suffer the scandal comes together to change things, if you do a political entity or not.
Today the problem is not that a majority of the left piece fits in with the right, but is left empty, the lack of players left in the world.
Who proposes the addition of other alternatives (competition-cooperation; speed-slow) to those meta-values, Revelli responds slowly bringing back the sense of limits and prudence, reciprocity and cooperation. The art of politics is the coexistence of the different, is not putting together similar and dissimilar out, so the nation-state must give way to Man Planetarium.
to my observation that violence is contrary to the left, when it pursues good ends with unfair means, and to the right consistency, when kept inequalities (structural violence) through violent means, Revelli says that violence unfortunately left was heard and theorized as a factor of change, acceleration of time, is rationality as a feature of the left, which should lead to overcome violence.
Faced with the current crisis of political resistance Revelli proposes a cultural reason together, in public places, cultivate the 'sweet passions "more interest.

Peyretti Henry, February 19, 2008

---------------------------- ----------------------
Note 1 - "The difference [between left and right] is among those who experience a sense of suffering to tackle inequalities and those who do not view the evidence and, essentially, on the contrary, they produce well-being and therefore should be supported. In this contrast, see the core of what is left and what is right " (Norberto Bobbio, in N. Bobbio, G. Bosetti, G. Vattimo, The Left in the era of karaoke, I Reset books, Donzelli, 1994, p. 51). In the same book, p. 47, Bobbio concludes his speech thus: "I'm tempted to say that the distinction goes beyond mere politics, is an almost anthropological."

Prosumer Camcorder Of 2010

La crisi europea e il problema dei diritti

Fabrizio Sciacca *


The results of the European elections of 2009 have revealed two things: a record low turnout showed the most skeptical of the EU policy, the general statement of the center-right parties and national and regional (from the British National Party Partija voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands, the Northern League in Italy) has made clear the need to give priority to urgent needs of the European defense as a defense of Europe. The disaffection with the much celebrated European citizenship and the general collapse of the left (from France, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, Italy) attest to the fact that the rights of Europeans should guarantee more rights in Europe, and more safely instead of with greater freedom.

The rights issue in Europe today means more than ever the problem of guaranteeing the rights of Europeans. As has been pointed out, "meet the demands of global justice in particular resistance members of affluent societies [affluent societies], because they seem to these threats to their life forms and their ways of life. If the resistance in these instances was motivated only by self-interest, this would not present any moral or philosophical puzzle, despite its obvious practical significance, politically. In fact, however, that resistance is often translated in terms of regulatory and defense in the name of moral ideas family. For example, it is argued that we have special responsibilities towards members of our families, communities, and society and that these responsibilities are both heavier and more extensive of our responsibility towards other people. Similarly, the argument continues, is not only possible but obligatory for us to do the interests of our associates - the people with whom they have a significant interpersonal - that is the priority over the interests of non-sister [...] may be granted, of course, that the priority request is not unlimited and that the interests of non-affiliates, may not be entirely dismissed. Within certain broad limits, however, we must give priority to the interests of our associates when they decide how to allocate time, energy and resources " 1. Rights crisis in Europe mainly concerns the conflict between the sense of belonging to an identity and sense of belonging to an institution. Il conflitto è stato probabilmente generato, e irrobustito, da un atteggiamento dell’Unione insufficiente o miope rispetto all’obiettivo di creare una simmetria, o una equivalenza, tra il senso di appartenenza identitaria e il senso di appartenenza istituzionale. Ciò che si è verificato è la diffusione di una crisi dell’opinione pubblica europea, che sorge e si manifesta in forme comunitarie distinte, ma convergenti nell’esprimere un rifiuto deciso di un sistema che non funziona. È un comunitarismo che può essere silenzioso, astensionista, persino qualunquista, o che porta all’espressione di un consenso mirante a strategie di sicurezza dei consociati, ovvero dei cittadini europei, più che alla rights of all residents. It is certainly the result of a historical process from product choices too demanding or too over the tools and resources to be allocated. It is perhaps the beginning of a new era of crisis, but want to avoid the loss of the sense of having a culture, as it is only through culture that the reality can be truly meaningful hearing. The demand that emerges brutal, clearly visible even without being told, they do not want to lose my culture: a set of skills and scientific knowledge characterizing the semantic grammar of individuals linked to their traditions and their forms of life. Paradoxically but understandably, the rights now claim that the institutional crisis in the EU are not universal rights. They are not human rights, but something as fundamental rights of Europeans. Voters have realized that the Union's policy has failed by focusing on citizenship as the requirement of safeguarding the European identity. The formal citizenship does not solve the problem of cultural conflicts.

What is the talk of pluralism in this case? Pluralism is only possible as the coexistence of mutual value in a given context. The unavoidable problem is that culturally related tend to coexist, not culturally related tend to avoid. This explains for example la sopravvivenza culturale di costumi irriducibilmente fondamentalisti da parte di membri di comunità islamiche nel Regno Unito. Cittadini britannici a tutti gli effetti, con un lavoro rispettabile (c’è un noto caso che riguardava alcuni medici, ad esempio), perfettamente integrati nella società, parlanti la lingua locale, nati nel luogo in cui vivono: eppure così saldamente legati a ideologie e valori non europei da coltivare valori anti-europei, per volere, in nome di quei valori, combattere (per distruggere) i capisaldi della cultura del territorio in cui sono nati, ma di cui essi non sono figli. Questo tipo di anti-cultura è l’opposto del senso della tolleranza liberale e del rispetto del pluralismo culturale, e crea di certo un senso di paralisi nella società britannica, la cui governance ha più volte preferito mettere a tacere il problema e non criticare le dottrine dei c.d. minority rights per paura di passare per ipocrita: con la conseguenza di alimentare da un lato una grievance culture, una cultura del risentimento, dall’altro un bisogno di sicurezza che spiega il dilagare dei consensi espressi a Nick Griffin. Senza dubbio, le società liberali stanno pagando l’effetto di aver accordato una sorta di acquiescenza, mascherata da tolleranza, nei confronti di ipotetici minority rights. Ciò ha prodotto una distorta dottrina capace di generare un’inversione morale in cui coloro che hanno generato e fomentato l’odio ingiusto sono stati sostanzialmente scusati solo in base al fatto di appartenere a un sedicente victim group, di contro a una maggioranza che invece è stata messa in guardia dal reagire perché ritenuta oppressione della parte aggressiva della società.

Ciò è parte delle minacce che hanno determinato quell’insicurezza sociale che ha fatto vacillare le basi del senso della tradizione e dell’autenticità degli europei. In Olanda è lo stesso: un ventiseienne marocchino-olandese uccide Theo van Gogh come fosse un animale sacrificale. Lancia sul suo petto, piantandolo come un pugnale, un biglietto di minacce dirette a Ayaan Hirsi Ali, l’attrice somala protagonista del cortometraggio Submission del regista olandese. L’imam di Tilburg non stringe la mano a Rita Verdonk, il ministro per l’integrazione delle minoranze: per lui è una donna straniera, e questo è sufficiente per non avvicinarla. La reazione del voto europeo è la risposta anche contro questo tipo di intolleranza interna da parte di quei non pochi non europei che vivono in Europa e che non vogliono cambiare la fisionomia della società europea trasformandola, ma distruggendola. Ed è anche la reazione contro l’incuria di quelle istituzioni pubbliche che hanno permesso che molti quartieri di città europee diventassero ghetti parabolici collegati con il Medio Oriente, con il Pakistan o con il Marocco. La crisi del presente attesta forse la crisi della stessa possibilità della politica. L’approdo exaggerated forms of populism in response to the violent sense of insecurity that threatens the Europeans also attest that the multicultural dream is over. He created an illusion, and has turned into a nightmare. Cultural pluralism is the only option that remains for Europeans to cling to the liberal culture of rights, but it is probably the son of another illusion: as a product of the Enlightenment, it is part of the Western liberal tradition, the moral of European law. It shares the venerable Kantian idea that the ideas are universally knowable through reason: we have inferred from this idea that our rights, being products of human reason, are at the bottom of something universal, and therefore extensible. So from this we inferred the idea that Western values \u200b\u200bare universalization. That this assumption is highly questionable should be more clear than ever now, if you want to accept the idea that the culture of rights, as part of the European gene pool, is not something that others are willing to share, and that others are willing to extrude from the cities of the continent. Cultures are physiologically self-resistant, and in competition with other trying to preserve itself, to survive, to endure and to survive trying to establish itself, and only if forced to give up or are willing to negotiate. Biologists and geneticists know that in primates superiori, esseri umani compresi, culturalmente prevale la trasmissione, non l’assimilazione; il problema è quindi che non sempre accade che il semplice fatto della promiscuità di più culture (ad esempio, culture locali e culture immigrate) in un certo territorio sia di per sé garanzia di mantenimento delle identità culturali. Il pluralismo che fonda la tolleranza, persino questa idea, è un’idea non universale; ci sono altre – molte altre – concezioni del mondo che non accettano nemmeno l’idea della semplice coesistenza, poiché non ritengono giusto condividere la struttura filosofica della simmetria su cui si fonda il concetto di tolleranza. Inevitabilmente contingente a questo concetto è an instrumental element to the very possibility of this practice civil reciprocity as a means of negotiating with the principle of tolerance. Under certain circumstances, therefore, the principle of tolerance is no longer strictly apply successfully and enters into crisis, especially when public institutions fail to find a viable alternative. The problem is the intransigence of an instrument of the Enlightenment, because on the one hand says that liberal democracy should be critically available on the other hand argues that the only thing non-negotiable is the use of violence. It is clear that the crisis is spreading when the non-negotiable values \u200b\u200bof non-violent conflict with the non- negoziabilità di valori fatti valere con la violenza. L’illuminismo liberaldemocratico entra completamente in crisi di fronte a ciò; e questo dilemma in decidibile provoca un collasso istituzionale. L’antieuropeismo di molti europei non è contro l’identità europea e nemmeno contro i diritti di molti individui, cittadini e residenti, che vivono in Europa.


* Questo lavoro riprende alcune idee che saranno pubblicate in uno scritto più ampio contenuto in F. Sciacca (a cura di), La dimensione istituzionale europea, Firenze 2009.


1 S. Scheffler, Boundaries and allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001, p. 82.